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Does the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) offer any hope 
for the progress of left-wing politics in the European Union?  Even 
the most enthusiastic ` Eurosocialist' would be hard-pushed to argue 
that a distinctively social-democratic policy direction is likely 
to emerge directly from decisions taken by the IGC, which is expected 
to complete its business of revising the Maastricht Treaty by the 
summer of 1997. Nevertheless, the IGC represents an important stage 
in the development of political integration, and the constitutional 
decisions it makes will have an important bearing on the evolving 
political culture of the EU. This paper examines the extent to which 
a distinctively social-democratic vision of Europe has emerged in 
the process of preparing for the IGC, and assesses the prospects 
for its realisation. 
 The IGC will be dominated by constitutional matters such as 
the right of veto and majority voting in the Council, co-decision 
making between the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, and 
the conditions and timing of the enlargement of the EU. The major 
inputs in the formation of the agenda have come from the Reflection 
Group, which comprised two MEPs, a Commissioner, and representatives 
of the member states' Foreign Ministries; the European Parliament, 
which has set out its agreed targets for institutional reform in 
the Martin-Bourlanges Report; the major political groupings - the 
Party of European Socialists (PES), the European People's Party 
(EPP), and the European Liberal, Democrat, and Reform Party (ELDR), 
which have all set down position papers; and perhaps most importantly, 
the statements of major government leaders, particularly Helmut 
Kohl. The weight of Germany's position as the EU's economic powerhouse 
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adds greatly to the strength of its strongly pro-federal position.  
 The British Conservative Government's adherence to the idea 
of a loose association of sovereign states in a trading bloc governed 
by neo-liberal assumptions is guaranteed to raise temperatures and 
grab the headlines. The Reflection Group's report made frequent 
reference to ` just one member state' which stood out against various 
measures strengthening political integration, such as increased 
powers to the Parliament and the Court of Justice, the ending of 
opt outs and the limitation of the power of veto. British exceptionalism 
is likely to mire the negotiations, but the IGC will be deliberately 
spun out in the hope that the obstacle is removed by the election 
of a Labour Government. The future constitution of the EU would 
then rest on the compromise that can be struck between social democracy 
and christian democracy.  
 In the lead-up to the IGC there have been attempts to build 
on the idea of a `Social Europe' pioneered by Jacques Delors, who 
envisaged the European Union as ` the theatre in which social democracy 
accomplishes its mission.'i Supported by Francois Mitterrand, the 
idea was promoted with much success among social-democratic and 
trades union elites, but it gained little wider support. Against 
a background of mass unemployment and zero growth, the acceptance 
of Maastricht was accomplished with great difficulty and little 
enthusiasm, with large sections of the Left openly hostile, 
particularly in France, Britain, and Denmark. Moves to promote an 
active Eurosocialism are still largely confined to elites, namely 
the leaderships of the various social-democratic parties, which 
act in concert through the PES, and the PES Group in the European 
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Parliament. The fact that this is an inter-governmental conference 
means that a direct place in negotiations goes only to those in 
government, giving disproportionate importance to the social 
democrats who are secure in government, as in Sweden and Portugal. 
The process of developing common positions from which to negotiate 
the shape of the EU into the next century is new and inevitably 
involves tensions, but we may be witnessing the foundations of a 
genuinely supranational politics. 
 
 
THE PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS  
 
The PES was set up in November 1992 as a result of Article 138a 
of the Maastricht Treaty, which gave legal status to the formation 
of Union-wide political parties. Despite the adoption of the ` party 
title' and the establishment of its own secretariat, it does not 
recruit directly and operates in a similar fashion to its predecessor 
organisation, the Confederation of Socialist Parties in the European 
Community.ii  The official position of the PES must be agreed by 
all of its constituent parties, and it is therefore more difficult 
to arrive at common positions than in the European Parliament's 
PES Group. Indeed Bardi has argued that that common positions arrived 
at by national party leaders owed little to the existence of the 
supranational parties, and, furthermore, that the EPP and ELDR parties 
have displayed more cohesiveness than the PES.iii  The Party Leaders' 
Conference, inaugurated with the PES at the Hague Conference, performs 
an ambiguous role; it reflects the potential for autonomous 
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supranational activity while simultaneously asserting control of 
EU-wide initiatives or responses by the leaders of the state parties. 
It was made clear from its inception that the ` organic development' 
of the PES was to be left to national parties, thereby circumscribing 
its autonomous development.iv  The priority of the views of state 
elites was fully revealed in July 1994 when the Socialist Group 
in the European Parliament decided to vote against accepting Jacques 
Santer as President of the Commission. When it came to the vote, 
the socialists from those countries where they were in Government 
(Spain, Greece, Denmark and Ireland), and from Portugal (with a 
Socialist President), voted for Santer, indicating that they were 
unwilling to go against the choice made by their national party 
leaders. v  While this episode provided more evidence that 
social-democracy had failed to develop a supranational politics, 
subsequent developments in preparation for the IGC have revealed 
clear signs of a nascent "Eurosocialism". 
 The Parliament's PES Group has been quite forceful in developing 
a ` Left' position on the future of the EU which has had a significant 
impact on the development of the PES's pre-IGC position paper, which 
was announced in Madrid in December 1995.vi The process of developing 
a common position began in 1994 when a Working Group on the IGC 
was set up within the PES Group. The initial "First Thoughts" document 
presented by Richard Corbett in June 1994 concentrated on 
constitutional issues and demanded that the IGC should provide 
`clarity, openness, efficiency and democracy.' vii  It contained 
virtually no distinctively social-democratic content, and indeed 
most of the recommendations were later embodied in the Parliament's 
P
st-Pr nt
  
 
 6 
collective position paper; an extension of qualified majority voting 
to avoid paralysis in decision-making, increased rights for 
Parliament to approve appointments and to initiate legislation, 
and more openness in decision making, especially in the Council 
of Ministers. These suggestions were endorsed at the Party Leaders' 
Conference prior to the Essen Summit in December 1994, attended 
by all the PES member-parties' leaders, Socialist Commissioners, 
the leader of the EP Socialist Group and the President of the Socialist 
International. The Essen Declaration pledged the leaders to present 
a joint position at the 1996 IGC in order to `revive the vision 
of a social and democratic union.'viii 
 A more ideological turn was taken thanks to the work of Elisabeth 
Guigou, European Affairs Minister in the last French Socialist 
Government and once an acolyte of Delors. Her own `Reflection Document' 
of February 1995 was far broader in scope than Corbett's technocratic 
paper, linking the IGC with the long-term development of the EU. 
She outlined three different scenarios for the future of the EU, 
depending on the outcome of the 1996 IGC: 
i) a politically strong Europe committed to sustainable growth and 
social progress;  
ii) a mini-reform requiring postponement of further enlargement; 
iii) a mini-reform accepting enlargement with few common policies, 
leaving a large free trade area for each state to seek advantage 
without concern for solidarity with others. 
The real danger of stumbling into the third scenario prompted Guigou 
to express the need to ` find ways of reconciling widening and deepening 
of the EU' by emphasising the social commitments which must be fought 
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for at the IGC.ix Guigou called for the application of the Delors 
White Paper of December 1993, "Growth, Competitivess, Employment", 
which outlined a programme of trans-European investment designed 
to create 15 million new jobs by 2000. The Guigou Report also demanded 
legislation against social dumping, a top-level investigation into 
ways of reducing work-time, and the specification of minimum levels 
of social protection. The call was made for the integration of the 
Social Charter of Fundamental Social Rights into a single `clear 
and concise' Treaty, and the encouragement of a dialogue between 
the `social partners' in transnational sectors.  
 The Guigou document led to a two day discussion in the full 
PES Parliamentary Group, which produced a much shorter report, "An 
Initial Approach to the 1996 Treaty Review Conference," presented 
by the leader of the PES Group, Pauline Green, in March 1995. The 
Green Report, in attempting to maximise support among the various 
socialist parties, adopted a cautious approach. Whereas Guigou had 
placed the social and economic policy demands at the forefront of 
her report, here they appeared only after a carefully considered 
stance on the constitutional issues. Indeed 17 Socialist MEPs voted 
against accepting the Report because they considered it too weak.x 
Nevertheless, a consensus on constitutional and social questions 
was beginning to emerge. The demand was made for a single concise 
Treaty with the various aspects referring to citizens' rights to 
be grouped together and supplemented by a specific competence to 
take action against racism, xenophobia, and anti-semitism. It was 
suggested that the Treaty should specify the obligation to respect 
the European Convention on Human Rights. There was a stress on openness 
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and accountability, with the demand that meetings of the Council 
at which binding legislation was discussed must be public, and the 
strengthening of powers of both the European Parliament and the 
national Parliaments. The latter would be able to appeal to the 
Court of Justice to cancel legislation which was deemed to be beyond 
the field of competence of the European institutions. The European 
Parliament would have its powers of co-decision making with the 
Council expanded to all areas, and would be granted the power to 
submit legislative proposals to the Council. It would have the power 
to elect the President of the Commission, who would then choose 
the Commissioners, in consultation with national governments and 
subject to a votes of confidence from the European Parliament. In 
social and economic policy, the report reiterated the demands for 
the prioritisation of the Delors White Paper proposals as an `immediate 
intermediary target' and for the fullest measure of social convergence. 
It reaffirmed the opposition to the UK opt-out on social legislation 
and insisted that the drive for monetary union should recognise 
the stated goals of maintaining a high level of employment and social 
protection. It also called for ecologically viable transport, energy 
and agricultural policies, and investment in the ` greening' of Europe. 
 The next major step to the definitive Eurosocialist position 
came in June 1995 with the presentation of the Wiersma Report of 
the PES Working Group to the Party Leaders Conference in Valbonne.xi 
Like the Guigou Report, its basic approach was driven by the conviction 
that ` the right wing, liberal concept of the EU as just a free-market 
zone has to be countered.'xii It also followed Guigou in placing 
`issues' ahead of`institutional change', and opened the discussion 
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of issues with unemployment and ecological renewal, the priorities 
eventually shared by the Conference of Leaders in December 1995. 
As it is these aspects of the position piece which can claim a 
distinctively social-democratic character, they are worthy of close 
consideration. Do they offer a realistic programme which can renew 
social-democratic politics following more than two decades of 
failures and setbacks at the level of the nation state?xiii 
 "Bringing the European Union into Balance" is the title of 
the Declaration of PES leaders, a reference to the need to secure 
treaty amendments `putting employment, social and environmental 
policy goals on the same level as economic and monetary integration.' 
On unemployment the PES wants a Treaty commitment to maximising 
the level of employment, plus provisions strengthening the capacity 
of the EU to co-ordinate job creation, labour-market and training 
and retaraining programmes. It seeks the optimal use of EU funds 
for employment generation, the implementation of trans-European 
investment programmes, the common promotion of information and 
communication technology, and a reduction of working time. These 
suggestions are made within the framework of a reaffirmed commitment 
to monetary union on schedule with as many states as possible on 
board. How realistic is all this? Although the specific endorsement 
of the Delors White Paper has been dropped, the substance of the 
suggestions contained in it has been reaffirmed. However, the means 
by which such commitments might be implemented are left unstated 
in the Declaration, despite the fact that they are crucial to the 
feasibility of a European Recovery Programme propelled by a 
social-democratic vision. It is necessary to look more closely at 
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this problem. 
 
 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECOVERY 
 
The bulk of the funding for the new investment suggested in the 
Delors White Paper was to come from loans and bonds guaranteed by 
the EU, which would effectively act as a state financing a Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement.xiv However, this option was effectively 
blocked at the Essen Summit in December 1994.xv 
This idea would have to be revived, and the funding for other 
European-wide initiatives from the budget would have to be earmarked. 
In the Delors Report, just over a quarter of the new annual investment 
of 20 billion ecus was due to come from the budget. Unfortunately, 
the financial framework for EU funding has already been decided 
for the period up until 1999,  and the Commission is not due to 
set out its proposals for the budget for the period 1999-2004 until 
the summer of 1997. The Commission will then be able to take into 
account the decisions of the IGC, the most pertinent of which will 
be the pace of enlargement. Cyprus and Malta are likely to be accepted 
quickly, but the central and eastern European countries will almost 
certainly have to wait until the early years of the next century. 
In the meantime, of course, the strict convergence criteria applied 
by Maastricht in preparation for monetary union have added to the 
pressures on public expenditure and borrowing which have been an 
ineluctable feature of the accelerated competition in the world 
market which followed on the collapse of the post-war boom in the 
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early 1970s. These neo-liberal prescriptions contributed greatly 
to the Euroscepticism displayed by many socialists in the wake of 
Maastricht.  
 The confident announcement of the Euro as the new currency 
unit at Madrid in December 1995 edged the EU closer to the reality 
of monetary union, but uncertainty remains over the timing of its 
implementation, the number of countries who will meet the convergence 
criteria and participate, and, of course, its consequences. Despite 
the `must do' statements from the Bundesbank and the Commission 
over meeting the 1999 schedule, Germany itself would have failed 
the public deficit target in 1995. If we assume that the single 
currency will happen, early in the next century, with most of the 
member states on board, what will be the consequences? Considerable 
savings on transaction costs would result, and much speculation 
in the financial markets would be eradicated. But taking away a 
state's ability to devalue could produce unprecedented effects on 
national economies, despite the assurances offered by meeting the 
tight criteria. An extension of the structural funds which have 
assisted the poorer countries in the past could provide insurance 
against national crises, but with eleven new relatively poor member 
states, the demand could outstrip the willingness of the richer 
countries to contribute to a vastly enlarged budget. Those hostile 
to the EU like to portray Brussels as a vast drain on the wealth 
of member nations. Historically, a high proportion of the budget 
has been devoted to the Common Agricultural Policy, with unevenly 
distributed benefits, leaving a relatively small amount for other 
purposes; the overall annual budget is approximately three per cent 
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of the public expenditure of all the member states.xvi Just how small 
is illustrated by the fact that the Japanese Government's recovery 
programme of 1992 involved an extra public investment equivalent 
to the entire annual budget of the EU.xvii So, even if the IGC provides 
greater powers to the European Parliament and we move inexorably 
closer to a federal state, the ` centre' will still lack the powers 
available to other federal or unitary states. 
 The importance of attaching socio-economic commitments to the 
Treaty should now be obvious. But it is also necessary to come up 
with concrete and realistic plans for implementing a recovery 
programme. The Delors White Paper, which was based on the work of 
a group of economists headed by Stuart Holland, is a starting point.xviii 
The specific proposal on employment policy which will be put before 
the IGC was presented by the Swedish Government in September 1995. 
The Swedes have asked for an `Employment Chapter' to be added to 
the Treaty, requiring member states to regard the attinment of high 
levels of employment as a matter of common concern. More specifically, 
it calls for the Social Affairs and Ecofinxix Councils to formulate 
annual guidelines for the employment policies of the member states, 
to provide each member state with full-employment programmes and 
to evaluate their progress, and to set up a permanent Employment 
Committee. The areas mentioned for coordinated action are labour 
market policy, training and retraining, and measures to prevent 
long-term unemployment and social exclusion. In true Swedish fashion 
they call for a strengthening of the ` Social Dialogue' between the 
social partners to ensure to improve the links between local 
decision-makers and the employment policy-makers at state and Union 
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level. 
 The Swedish initiative epitomises the image of a social 
corporatist Europe which draws apoplectic reactions from the British 
Conservatives. The flat contradiction between the social-democratic 
and the neo-liberal perspectives on employment was displayed at 
the Madrid summit in December 1995, when the issue was referred 
back to the Commission to produce a ` comprehensive review' for the 
Dublin summit at the end of 1996. This caused the new Portuguese 
Socialist Prime Minister Antonio Guerres to complain that the summit 
was ` spinning our wheels' on the issue and that things had to change.xx 
But what might such a change look like? The British Conservatives 
favour the US model, minimising regulation to increase ` flexibility' 
in the labour market, creating employment because labour costs are 
so low. This is invariably presented as a `technical' argument, 
without considering the social effects. The widening disparities 
in income and the constant diminution in social provision inevitably 
produce a divided, despairing, and dangerous society.xxi It also 
ignores the high level of federal aid granted to US industry of 
the sort which Delors wanted to develop in the EU but was unable 
to develop. For example, early in the Clinton Presidency the Federal 
Government agreed to pump millions of dollars into research and 
development for a fuel-efficient car in collaboration with all three 
remaining US car manufacturers and the car workers' unions.xxii A 
similar arrangement had already been made in Japan with its five 
car companies, and Delors, when President of the Commission, wanted 
to promote a similar initiative to encourage collaboration among 
European manufacturers. His complaint was that such an initiative 
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would be opposed by Britain on the grounds that Toyota was based 
in Britain and could not be excluded. He speculated that a similar 
initiative on retraining would also be opposed, and that, ultimately, 
the EU could not act in the way that its competitors had already 
acted.xxiii  
 Between the neo-liberal model favoured by the British 
Conservatives and the social-democratic models articulated by the 
Swedish SAP, the official German position represents something of 
a via media. Kohl wants a single currency as quickly as possible 
for as many states as possible, and assumes that once it is a reality 
few states will find it advantageous to stay outside. The German 
Government has consistently supported the enhancement of the powers 
of the European Parliament and would have few problems with shoring 
up citizens rights. It would certainly baulk at the degree of economic 
interventionism favoured by left social-democrats, but if the 
framework for a federal Europe were to be agreed in the short-term, 
the argument for a recovery programme with strong social-democratic 
elements could be developed quickly. All eyes therefore turn to 
Britain for the timing and result of the next general election. 
  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although it can be shown that a distinctively social democratic 
perspective on the development of the EU has evolved in recent years, 
it is evident that this process has been almost exclusively confined 
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to political and trade-union elites. Attempts have been made to 
develop a more popular base for the Social Europe position by groups 
such as the European Socialist Initiative, the Left European Forum, 
and Links Europa, but their success will be limited as long as the 
focus of political life remains fixed on the state. The IGC is an 
important stage in the process of developing democratic politics 
at the EU level, the appropriateness of which will be more generally 
understood when monetary union takes place. Many sections of the 
Left will be deeply unhappy with such a development, but their old 
dreams of a national road to socialism have irrevocably faded, and 
the EU offers the only prospect for a reassertion of political 
regulation of the power of global capital.xxiv 
 This leads to a final point, a methodological one. It should 
be clear from our discussion that the changing nature of economic 
and political relations in the European Union can be understood 
only by transcending the conventional distinction between `economics' 
and ` politics'. David Marquand has argued that the Maastricht process 
was imbued with a `technocratic economism' which failed to take 
account of the political obstacles to monetary union. He concludes: 
The notion that politics can be a sort of cart, dragged along by 
the horse of economics, has no place outside the fairytale 
worlds of classical Marxism and classical economic liberalism. 
In the real world, politics is always the horse and economics 
the cart.xxv 
We concur with Marquand's characterisation of the Maastricht 
process,xxvi but his simple reversal of the causal relationship between 
economics and politics merely reproduces the categorial problem 
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in an equally unsatisfactory way. Liberal theory has long held to 
a rigid separation of politics and economics (the state - civil 
society distinction), and in capitalist societies economic decisions 
are frequently taken without democratic consultation, irrespective 
of their political consequences. The Single European Act was enacted 
without serious political discussion, on the grounds that it was 
primarily economic, despite imposing enormous constraints on national 
governments. Only when the process was politically consecrated at 
Maastricht did the arguments erupt, post festum. But the fact that 
the capitalist world continues to operate a demarcation of politics 
and economics does not justify the simple epistemological reversal 
of the causal relationship which leaves the dichotomy intact; the 
`horse and cart' nexus is as dated as the metaphor. Social democracy, 
as its name once implied, originally challenged the restriction 
of `democracy' to the narrowly defined world of political life. 
In order to identify the structure of power relations today, what 
is required is a global political economy perspective, widened and 
deepened by cultural analysis. So far the process of European 
integration has diminished democracy and replaced it with 
technocratic elitism. The cautious advance of Eurosocialism offers 
a glimpse, and no more, of a future in which citizens are offered 
a choice when it comes to deciding what sort of society they want, 
and what sort of world. 
 
 
 
 
Post-Pr
t
  
 
  
  
 17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NOTES 
i. Jacques Delors, "A New Frontier for Social Democracy?" in Piet 
Dankert & Ad Kooyman (eds), Europe Without Frontiers: Socialists 
on the Future of the European Economic Community, New York, 1989, 
p. 32. In Britain the main forum for the Eurosocialist approach 
has been European Labour Forum, edited by Ken Coates, MEP. 
ii. For a discussion of the EP Socialist Group and the Confederation 
of Socialist Parties of the EC prior to Maastricht see Robert Ladrech, 
"Social Democratic Parties and EC Integration" in the European Journal 
of Political Research, vol. 24, 1993, pp. 206-8; also Simon Hix, 
 
Post-Print
  
 
  
  
 18
"The Emerging EC Party System? The European Party Federations in 
the Intergovernmental Conferences" in Politics 13 (2), 1993. 
iii . L. Bardi, "Transnational Party Federations, European 
Parliamentary Party Groups, and the Building of Europarties" in 
R. Katz and P. Mair (eds), How Parties Organise (London: Sage, 1994), 
pp. 359-68. 
iv. Willy Claes, "What's In a Name?" in European Labour Forum 10, 
1993, pp. 9-12; see also the immediately following comments of leading 
European social democrats indicating that the party was going to 
be little more than a coordinating committee. 
v. Selection of MEPs by national list makes them particularly 
susceptible to pressure from their national party leaders. 
vi. Party of European Socialists Conference of Leaders Declaration, 
Bringing The European Union Into Balance, Madrid, 14 December 1995. 
vii. Richard Corbett was the a Principal Administrator in the European 
Parliament on secondment to the Secretariat of the PES Group. He 
later became Deputy Secretary Genereal of the PES. 
viii. Agence Europe 8 December, 1994. 
ix . Elisabeth Guigou, "Reflection Document" presented to the 
extraordinary meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the PES, February 
6-7, 1995, in Brussels. 
x. Agence Europe, 31 March 1995. 
xi. The working party was independent of the European Parliament's 
PES Group. It was chaired by Gerard Fuchs of the French Socialist 
Party. Wiersma was the vice-chair and rapporteur. 
xii. Jan Marinus Wiersma (rapporteur), The 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference, Report of the PES Working Party, Brussels, June 1995. 
xiii. For a full analysis see Lawrence Wilde, Modern European Socialism 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994). 
xiv. The Economist, December 11-17, 1993, pp. 27-8. 
xv. Ken Coates, "The Sickness in the Heart of Things" in European 
Labour Forum 15, Summer 1995, p. 1. 
xvi. Jacques Delors, "The Scope and Limits of Community Action" 
in Ken Coates & Michael Barratt Brown (eds) A European Recovery 
Programme (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1993), p. 46. 
xvii. Stuart Holland, The European Imperative: Economic and Social 
Cohesion in the 1990s (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1993), pp. 38-9. 
 
Post-P
int
  
 
  
 19 
xviii. Ibid. Holland's book was a Report to the Commission of the 
(then) EC, and formed the basis for the White Paper. 
xix. Economic and Finance Ministers. 
xx. Reuter Textline, (Q2:39), 17 December 1995. 
xxi. John Palmer has pointed out that two per cent of the potential 
US male labour force is in jail; "Europe Working" in the Sunday 
Tribune [Ireland], 27 November 1994, p. 3. 
xxii. Martin Walker, The Guardian, September 30, 1993. 
xxiii. Jacques Delors, "The Scope and Limits of Community Action," 
pp. 48-9. 
xxiv. Ken Coates, "Creating A European Left" in Labour Focus on 
Eastern Europe 50, Spring 1995, pp. 62-70. See also Wilde, Modern 
European Socialism, passim. 
xxv. David Marquand, "Reinventing Federalism: Europe and the Left" 
in New Left Review 203, 1994, p. 25. 
xxvi. For an excellent analysis of the reaction to the steamrolling 
of Maastricht see M. Franklin, M. Marsh, L. McLaren, "Uncorking 
the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake 
of Maastricht" in Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (4), December 
1994.  
P
st-Print
